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CONFLICT BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE
LEGISLATURE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been more than twenty years since the landmark Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, I declared that the "separate but
equal" doctrine2 had no place in the field of public education.3 In that case,
the Court abandoned its prior approach in considering whether the separation
of the races was in fact equal, 4 and based its decision instead on "the effect of
segregation itself on public education."5 As to this effect, the Court opined:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.
6
The Court also considered the psychological effect of school segregation on
the children themselves7 and ruled on the basis of these factors that "[s]epa-
rate educational facilities [were] inherently unequal." '8
It has recently been pointed out, however, that throughout the country,
particularly in the larger cities, black and white children continue to attend
school primarily with members of their own race. 9 Thus, after two decades of
time and effort invested by all branches of the federal government, the
problems of segregation and racial isolation persist in the United States. It is
the purpose of this Comment to analyze the efforts of the federal judiciary and
legislature in attempting to achieve equal educational opportunity. Although
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [Brown I].
2. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court had condoned the forced separation
of the races as long as the facilities accorded each were of an equal nature and quality.
3. 347 U.S. at 495.
4. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
5. 347 U.S. at 492.
6. Id. at 493.
7. Id. at 494. This reasoning has been used more recently in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.
Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), where the court held that "[ildentifiably one-race schools in a school
system are to be eliminated because of two sorts of injury that may be inflicted on the minority
students in such a school system. First, racial or ethnic isolation is likely to be felt as an affront.
The one-race identification of the school is a continual reminder of the past exclusionary practices
of the school system .... Second, minority students assigned to identifiably minority schools are
cut off from the majority culture which is widely reflected in the standards, explicit and implicit,
that determine success in our society." Id. at 232.
8. 347 U.S. at 495.
9. Dell'Ario, Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on the Equity Power of the Federal
Courts?, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 113 (1975).
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this term is subject to varied definitions and applications, 10 this analysis will
use it to imply the broadest connotation, that of "universal education,"" or
the ability of every child to receive a quality education regardless of race or
social status. 12 Although some primary consideration must be given to the
efforts of the courts, the major focus of this analysis concerns attempts by the
legislature to deal with problems arising from the interest in providing equal
educational opportunity. In considering the role of the courts and legislature
in this area, it is important that the efforts of each of these branches of
government be considered in light of its effect upon the other. Finally, there
will be a brief consideration of the reactions of the public, those most affected
by these federal actions.
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS
In any consideration of the Supreme Court's efforts to eliminate school
segregation, the primary basis of attaining jurisdiction and fashioning a
remedy is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, which
requires state action to trigger its effect. 13 This has led to the promulgation of
a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation,' 4 and the Court's
refusal to intervene' s in other than de jure instances. 16
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,'7 the Court
attempted to define more clearly and precisely the scope of the duties of school
10. E.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (equal educational opportunity referred to as
"the equal protection clause in its application to public school education').
11. The Fund for the Advancement of Education, Decade of Experiment 1951-1961, at 71
(1961).
12. The scope of this Comment is confined to school attendance policies, and so does not
consider related decisions dealing with the role of state and local governments in the financing of
public primary and secondary schools. Thus, the decision in San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), will not be considered.
13. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
14. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) defined de jure segregation as that "specifically mandated
by law or by public policy pursued under color of law," and de facto segregation as the situation
resulting from "social or other conditions for which government cannot be held responsible." Id.
at 493. It appears that the key phrase in these definitions is "for which government cannot be held
responsible," since valid arguments can be made that all school segregation is a result of some
form of state action. See notes 39-42 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). In Swann, the
Court warned that there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a
racial basis without first finding a constitutional violation of equal protection.
16. It has been held that three elements must exist in order to justify a finding of de jure
segregation: "(1) action or inaction by public officials (2) with a segregative purpose (3) which
actually results in increased or continued segregation in the public schools." Oliver v. Michigan
State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); see
Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
17. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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officials and district courts in implementing the mandate of Brown I to
eliminate dual school systems and establish unitary ones. 18 There it was held
that when the operation of a dual school system was found to exist,19 "the first
remedial responsibility of school authorities is to eliminate invidious racial
distinctions."'20 The Court approved the use of bus transportation as a tool of
school desegregation. 2 This seemed in keeping with the Court's stated policy
to fashion relief in such a way as "will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future. "22
The apparent simplicity of this procedure is deceptive, however, as there
are certain broad policy limitations involved which may have the effect of
hampering judicial remedies. In the first place, there is the caveat that the
efforts of the district judge and school authorities in achieving desegregation
must be undertaken within the confines of "the practicalities of the situa-
tion."'23 The vagueness inherent in court desegregation orders can also have
the effect of limiting the scope of application of a remedy. 24 A third possible
limitation on the scope of available remedies may be discerned in the Swann
dictum absolving school authorities of the responsibility of making annual
adjustments to racial composition of schools once desegregation has been
accomplished. 25
18. Id. at 6. The Court reiterated, however, that "[t]he objective today remains to eliminate
from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." Id. at 15. "The task is to
correct," it continued, "by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that
offends the Constitution." Id. at 16.
19. The Court here referred to Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), where It
previously held that when such factors as faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities,
and facilities are so arranged as to make possible the identification of a school as a "white school"
or a "Negro school," then "a prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights
under the Equal Protection Clause is shown." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd, of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
20. 402 U.S. at 18.
21. Id. at 29-31.
22. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965); accord, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.
Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975).
23. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). These practicalities have
recently been defined as "simply all the legitimate concerns of the community[, of which] [tihere
can be no exhaustive list." 401 F. Supp. at 233.
24. The uncertainty, while ostensibly designed to allow some discretion to local authorities In
executing the remedial order, has made it difficult for school authorities to know precisely what is
required to comply with the decree. See Note, School Desegregation: New Quandaries and Old
Dilemmas, 43 Fordhan L. Rev. 273 (1974). But see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp.
673, 696-97 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975),
enforcing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
25. 402 U.S. at 31-32. This restriction, however, has been given a limited interpretation in
subsequent cases, and its effect is not of great consequence. See, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ., 519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 355 (1975), where this has been
held not to become operative until the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished,
and when racial discrimination has been eliminated from the system. Id. at 437.
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In spite of these limitations, however, the Court, in keeping with its
objective of eliminating the dual school system, has been emphatic in ordering
an end to de jure segregation when it is found. 26 Among the plans which have
been used to varying degrees of effectiveness are: freedom-of-choice, 27 geo-
graphic zoning, 28 and transportation. 29 The common result of these, and any
other judicially imposed remedies, is that the school district is burdened with
an affirmative duty "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work . . . now"3 0 until it is clear that state imposed segregation has been
completely removed. 31
To assist in identifying the situations in which the Court will exercise its
jurisdiction, a test for recognizing de jure as opposed to de facto segregation 32
has been formulated. The key element is identified as a "purpose or intent to
segregate. '33 This emphasis has changed the thrust of the Court's policy only
26. "Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assign-
ment of students on a racial basis. . . . The remedy for [deliberate] segregation may be
administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose
burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim
period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school systems." Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
27. Under the freedom-of-choice plan, students are given the opportunity to decide which
particular school to attend in the district. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
433-34 (1968); United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 410 F.2d 626, 628 (Sth
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970). This plan is generally held to be ineffective as
doing little more than "simply . . . burdening] children and their parents with a responsibility
which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board." Green v. County School Bd., supra at
441-42. Thus its viability is restricted to situations where the court is convinced that desegrega-
tion can be achieved on a voluntary basis. E.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 519
F.2d 430 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 355 (1975); United States v. Georgia, 466 F.2d 197
(5th Cir. 1972); Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970); Hall v. St. Helena
Parish School Bd., 424 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1970); Clark v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th
Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971).
28. Here, boundary lines are drawn on a nondiscriminatory basis, thus accommodating the
concept of the neighborhood school within the desegregation plan. Usually, the first step in
implementing such a plan is to have the local district make a survey of the area, and draw the
lines on the basis of those findings, making certain that they are used to aid the desegregation
process rather than to perpetuate segregation. E.g., United States v. Indianola Municipal
Separate School Dist., 410 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970);
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 393 F.2d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1968).
29. See parts III & IV infra. In using this method, the courts have attempted to minimize the
inconvenience of excessive travel and leave the basic educational process unimpaired. Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971). The district must also exercise
care that the burden of transportation is shared equally by students of all races. Clark v. Board of
Educ., 449 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Allen v. Asheville City
Bd. of Educ., 434 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1970). See generally Note, School Desegregation: New
Quandaries and Old Dilemmas, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 273 (1974).
30. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
31. Id.
32. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
33. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
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one year after a decision that examination of the motivation of intent of the
school authorities "is as irrelevant as it is fruitless," 34 and that the controlling
factor in determining whether a remedy is to be imposed is the effect of the
school board's acts.35 It has been observed that there is a basic problem
inherent in differentiating between intent and effect, since the Court has
never defined the elements which establish segregative intent. 36 Thus the
Court, in attempting to set a national standard for solving school desegrega-
tion cases, has created more confusion and uncertainty in its insistence upon
retaining a strict adherence to the de jure-de facto distinction. 37
The Court has been urged to eliminate this distinction-the arguments
sometimes based on logic38 and in other instances supported by precedent. 39
Justice Douglas had consistently argued for the elimination of the distinc-
tion, 40 putting forth the proposition that de facto segregation is little more
34. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S.' 451, 462 (1972).
35. Id. The distinction between intent and effect is very fine and has been received by the
lower courts with varying results. While some have had little difficulty applying the new standard
to reinforce a refusal to consider issues involving de facto segregation, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580, 585 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), at least one circuit has taken
inconsistent approaches. Compare Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), with
Berry v. School Dist., 505 F.2d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 1974).
36. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 232-33 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). It is further argued that even if such a definition were available, "wide
and unpredictable differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable when dealing with an
issue as slippery as 'intent' or 'purpose,' especially when related to hundreds of decisions made by
school authorities under varying conditions over many years." Id. at 233.
37. Cf. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 864 (5th Cir. 1972), where the
court ruled that there was no need to "define the quantity of state participation which is a
prerequisite to a finding of constitutional violation. Like the legal concepts of 'the reasonable
man', 'due care', 'causation', 'preponderance of the evidence', and 'beyond a reasonable doubt',
the necessary degree of state involvement is incapable of precise definition and must be defined on
a case-by-case basis." See also Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 584 (1965).
38. "Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether the segregation is state-created or
state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The
school board exercises pervasive and continuing responsibility over the long-range planning as
well as the daily operations of the public school system. It sets policies on attendance zones,
faculty employment and assignments, school construction, closings and consolidations, and
myriad other matters." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 227 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court held that members of the
school board and the superintendent of schools were state officials from the point of view of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 16. The Court added that "[tihe Constitution created a government
dedicated to equal justice under law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that
ideal. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or
property cannot be squared with the Amendment's command that no State shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 19. The Court futher
expanded the scope of state action to political subdivisions of the states. See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
40. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 761 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 216 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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than subtle state action causing segregated schools through housing and
zoning policies. 4 1 A majority of the Court has ruled otherwise. 42
In Milliken v. Bradley,43 the Court refused to expand the mandate to
eliminate dual systems arising from de jure segregation to include those where
segregation is not the direct result of state or local government action. It was
there held that a court had no constitutional power to order relief causing the
racially isolated Detroit school district to be balanced with the schools of
surrounding districts when only the Detroit schools had been affected by de
jure segregation. 44 The effect of this ruling appeared to be that now "the
idiosyncrasies of school district boundary lines will determine the 'equality'
reached in the schools in each area. ' 4s The strict adherence to this principle
appears to revitalize the injustice elucidated by Justice Harlan's dissent in the
Civil Rights Cases,4 6 an early interpretation of the state action requirement of
the fourteenth amendment:47
I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of
the Constitution [the 13th and 14th] have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious
41. 413 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring). Indeed, this seemingly was the position of a
unanimous Court only two years prior to Keyes when it was held that: "The construction of new
schools and the closing of old ones are two of the most important functions of local school
authorities and also two of the most complex.... The location of schools may... influence the
patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on
composition of inner-city neighborhoods.
"In the past, choices in this respect have been used as a potent weapon for creating or
maintaining a state-segregated school system. In addition to the classic pattern of building schools
specifically intended for Negro or white students, school authorities have sometimes, since
Brown, closed schools which appeared likely to become racially mixed through changes in
neighborhood residential patterns. This was sometimes accompanied by building new schools in
the areas of white suburban expansion farthest from Negro population centers in order to
maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure from the formal principles of
'neighborhood zoning.' Such a policy does more than simply influence the short-run composition
of the student body of a new school. It may well promote segregated residential patterns which,
when combined with 'neighborhood zoning,' further lock the school system into the mold of
separation of the races. Upon a proper showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a
remedy." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).
42. Keyes v. School DisL No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211-13 (1973). The proponents of Justice
Douglas' argument must now content themselves with expressing these views in dissenting
opinions. It cannot be determined with any certainty why the Court has made this change;
perhaps it is a reaction to the political consequences of such decisions. See text accompanying
notes 152-53 infra. It could also be a reflection of the growing complexity of the issues involved in
more recent cases. Levin & Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the Use
of Social Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. SO, 55 (1975).
43. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
44. Id. at 745.
45. Dell'Ario, Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on the Equity Power of the Federal
Courts?, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 113, 150 (1975). The majority in Milliken expressly rejected this
line of argument, however, declaring that a cross-district remedy could only be supported "by
drastic expansion of the constitutional right itself, an expansion without any support in either
constitutional principle or precedent." 418 U.S. at 747.
46. 109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 10-11.
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verbal criticism. "It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes
the law: the letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is the soul."
.. . [T]he court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of
constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they were
adopted. 4
8
III. THE CONGRESS
In light of the Court's stance with respect to busing to achieve school
desegregation, it is appropriate to look into congressional attempts to legislate
in this area. A relationship between the two branches of government exists in
the constitutional provision giving Congress power to determine the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. 49 Theoretically, the legislative effect on the prob-
lems of school segregation can range from providing a comprehensive remedy
for all discrimination to the other extreme of denying jurisdiction to the Court
in any such case.
The first important legislative attempt to provide equal educational oppor-
tunity came with the passage of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.50
The legislation contains basic provisions: a vesting of authority in the United
States Attorney General to initiate or intervene in school desegregation cases
after receiving a written complaint from students who are unable to sue on
their own behalf;51 and an authorization of funds to the United States
Commissioner of Education for providing technical assistance, financial
grants and training institutes to help communities prepare for school desegre-
gation. 52 On their face, these provisions appear to enhance the remedy-
granting power of the courts in dealing with problems of segregation by
expanding the requirements of standing to bring suit and by providing
assistance in the transition to a unitary school system. 53 Another feature of
this legislation was that it provided, for the first time, a definition of
desegregation as "the assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin, but
'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in
order to overcome racial imbalance. '5 4
It is apparent, however, that the provisions of Title IV are neither as
clear-cut nor as expansive as one would believe. The definition of desegrega-
tion explicitly excludes the assignment of students "to overcome racial imbal-
ance," 55 and a subsequent section specifically warns that its provisions do not
48. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("TIThe supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction
. with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.').
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1970).
51. Id. § 2000c-6.
52. Id. §§ 2000c-2, -3.
53. See the discussion of judicial consideration of local problems in eliminating segregation in
notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
55. Id.
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empower "any official or court of the United States . . . [to require] the
transportation of. . . students. . . to achieve such racial balance ....11S6
The guidelines for administration of this program" 7 formulated by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare make explicit within its
definition of desegregation that the Act is not meant to be imposed upon de
facto segregated districts.5 8 Criteria of eligibility for assistance are established,
providing that a school board "may make application... for a grant to pay,
in whole or in part, the cost of employing a specialist to advise in problems
incident to desegregation . . .,s
Both the terms of the Act itself and the regulations formulated to adminis-
ter it pay considerable attention to the concept of student assignment in order
to "overcome racial imbalance," 60 a concept which has considera6le legal
significance. An analysis of the legislative intent behind the passage of Title
IV is useful in evaluating this phrase.
The intent of Title IV was to speed progress "toward eradicating significant
areas of discrimination on a nationwide basis," 61 and thus the bill was
"designed primarily to protect and provide more effective means to enforce
the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." 62
Unfortunately, these general statements have not been shown to have the
legal effect that accompanies substantive provisions of the legislation.
Moreover, it appears that this limited effectiveness was intentional.
The original proposal for Title IV contained no reference to the concept of
"racial imbalance" in its definition of desegregation. 63 The idea was only later
introduced 64 to prevent any semblance of congressional intent to correct
56. Id. § 200c-6(a).
57. 45 C.F.R. § 180.01-.45 (1975).
58. The Department adopts the congressional definition in 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b), as amended,
(Supp. II, 1972), and adds that "[flor purposes of this paragraph, overcoming racial imbalance
means the assignment of students to correct conditions of segregation or separation . .. not
resulting from State or local law or official action." 45 C.F.R. § 180.02(a)(1) (1975). Compare the
definition of de facto segregation in note 14 supra.
59. 45 C.F.R. § 180.41 (1975). It is interesting to note that there is no longer a requirement
that the applicant district be desegregating, nor does HEW give any definition of "problems
incident to desegregation." Compare id. § 180.41 (1974).
60. See notes 56, 58 supra and accompanying text.
61. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2393 (1964).
62. Id. at 2391. A further statement of policy and goals provides that: "Every segment of
American life must bear a heavy burden in this epochal struggle. Congress must move
rapidly-more rapidly than it has to date-to legislate intelligently and effectively in this critical
area. The agencies of Government must strive more actively to enforce the law of the land. The
courts-State and Federal-must exercise greater vigilance in guarding the interests of all the
people. Each citizen must make a greater effort to respect the dignity of his fellow man." Id. at
2518-19.
63. Id. at 2452.
64. This amendment was attacked by southern legislators as a means of exempting northern
cities, which had little de jure segregation, from their obligations under the legislation to provide
for racial equality in the schools. See notes 71-72 infra and accompanying text.
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conditions of de facto segregation. 65 That this reference was directed at the
Supreme Court policy on desegregation is vividly pointed out by the com-
ments of Senator Russell of Georgia:
We have been told over and over since 1954 that the Supreme Court has decided
against segregation. It has said that the minds, the hearts, and the lives of the young
colored people would be destroyed unless they could sit by the white children in
school.
The proponents [of this amendment] say now: "When you threaten our school, we
will build a fort that not even the Supreme Court of the United States can attack,
because we will not let it have jurisdiction of this matter. It matters not what happens
to the minds, the hearts, and the futures of the little colored children in Boston and
New York, because we are not going to let the Court act there at all. We are going to
give the Government every weapon, every device, every power that the mind of man
can conceive to move into the Southern States and proceed against the same state of
affairs." 66
Thus the mandate to desegregate in Brown 167 and Brown 1168 had been
legislatively limited to de jure situations, 69 as rooted in the state action
requirement of the fourteenth amendment. 70 The result of this aspect of the
legislation was that "[tlhese provisions in title . . . IV create no new rights,"7'
and thus it was still impossible to "force 'integration' on those localities that
make it possible for blacks to attend schools without discrimination.17 2 So
Congress had given the force of law to what was, at that time, the Court's
interpretation of a constitutional limitation requiring that only what could be
classified as de jure segregation would be remedied. This rationale has
recently been criticized since these judicial interpretations were so unsettled as
to make their value as building blocks questionable. 7 3 Obviously those who
sought to limit the Court's interference in the affairs of local school districts
had yet another point to rely on.
The courts have received this legislation without confronting problems of
interpretation, and the Act has become yet another means.of reaffirming the
65. 110 Cong. Rec. 2280 (1964) (remarks of Representative Cramer). It has also been
observed that Congress failed to extend assistance to include problems of "racial imbalance"
because no adequate definition of the term could be provided. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2508 (1964).
66. 110 Cong. Rec. 13821-22 (1964). Senator Humphrey responded to this by pointing out
that there is no affirmative duty under the Constitution to seek racial balance, and urged Senators
to maintain the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Id. at 13821.
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
68. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
69. The decision in Brown I was based on the psychological effect of school segregation on
the students. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text. On that basis, it could conceivably have
been argued that this would require remedial action in de facto as well as de jure situations.
70. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
71. 110 Cong. Rec. 6539 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). This concession effectively
resolved the bitter debate in which southern legislators objected that their part of the country
would be burdened by a wave of new desegregation orders. Id. at 13820-22.
72. J. Bolner & R. Shanley, Busing: The Political and Judicial Process 57 (1974).
73. Id.
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judicial policy of refusing to act in de facto situations. 74 The other legislative
restriction, denying power to the courts to order transportation to achieve
racial balance, 75 has been narrowly construed by the courts as a means of
preventing further expansion of judicial power, rather than as a restriction or
withdrawal of the court's broad equity powers. 7 6 Such interpretation is
uniform throughout the federal court system, 77 giving rise to holdings affirm-
ing a district's self-initiated transportation plan to overcome racial imbal-
ance, 78 as well as a transportation order to remedy de jure segregation. 79 It
would seem then that in spite of congressional attempts to control the
remedial jurisdiction of the federal courts, there exists an affirmative duty to
bring about integrated, unitary school systems8" if de jure segregation is
proven to exist.8 ' -
In 1970, Congress enacted the Emergency School Assistance Program
(ESAP)82 to assist local school districts in efforts to desegregate.8 3 Under this
program, funds were made available to school districts to meet special needs
incident to the elimination of segregation among students and faculty in
elementary and secondary schools.8 4 This legislation seemed to involve a more
concentrated attack on school segregation in that it affirmatively proscribed
certain actions on the part of a school district. None of the $75,000,000 in
funds could be used to assist any district which had aided a non-public school
engaged in discrimination; nor to supplant non-federal grants that were
reduced as a result of the desegregation; nor to carry out any program that
denied funds to a school district because it was desegregating.8 " This ap-
proach seems to address directly the problems of discrimination within the
school district itself, rather than the limitations on the courts and the Office of
Education contained within Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.86 It
74. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
76. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971).
77. E.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 886 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). In this decision, the court provided that "the equitable powers
of the courts exist independently of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at 880. See also United
States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
78. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1971); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 880 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
79. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 524 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
80. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
81. This situation raises the question of whether Congress can really have a meaningful effect
in the area of school desegregation unless it withdraws all court power to act; a possibility which
the electoral pressures on Congress are likely to prevent. See also text accompanying notes 114,
122 infra.
82. Act of Aug. 18, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-380, tit. I, 84 Stat. 800, 803.
83. Id.
84. 45 C.F.R. § 181.2 (1975). One helpful aspect of this act was the presentation of criteria
for consideration in allocating assistance under these provisions. See id. § 181.10.
85. Act of Aug. 18, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-380, tit. I, 84 Stat. 800, 804.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); see notes 55-56 supra and
accompanying text.
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appears that while Title IV emphasized the de facto-de jure distinction, ESAP
looked beyond that issue to tangible improvements in the access to educa-
tional facilities for all races. Indeed the federal regulations governing the
administration of this Act 7 establish that the purpose of the legislation, and
the financial assistance it provided, was "to achieve successful desegregation
and the elimination of all forms of discrimination in the schools on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin."""
The confusion and controversy arising from this seemingly clear regulation
is illustrated by Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education.89 The
action was brought after the defendant school district was ordered by the
court to use busing to achieve desegregation, and the district was subse-
quently refused federal assistance under the Emergency School Assistance
Program. It was a third-party action by defendants to compel federal officials
to provide the necessary funding. 90 In awarding relief to the school district, 91
the court provided an interesting insight into the administrative policies
behind the Act. It appeared that a commissioner from the United States Office
of Education had issued a letter stating that the policy of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare was to accord a low funding priority to
transportation requests under ESAP. 92 This policy was endorsed by strong
statements.in opposition to busing by President Nixon, 93 leaving the entire
issue in a precarious position. The court determined that the regulations for
disbursement of funds under the Act lacked an affirmative statement on bus
transportation, and that the restrictive policies resulted from negative reaction
to the Swann decision which had ordered the transportation of students to
achieve desegregation. 94 The court concluded that this informally enforced
prohibition 95 was illegal in its operation. 96 It thus appears that the congres-
sional intent to assist the courts and local educational agencies by the clear
language of the Act was almost used as another means of minimizing the
amount of change actually realized. 97 There was, on the one hand, a clear
and explicit piece of legislation aimed at alleviating this national problem,
while at the same time the arm of government charged with administration
and execution of these laws was actively restricting its practical application.
In 1972, Congress superseded ESAP, enacting the Emergency School Aid
Act (ESAA),98 in order to meet the needs incident to desegregation; to
encourage school districts to engage in voluntary efforts to eliminate, reduce,
87. 45 C.F.R. § 181.1 (1975).
88. Id. § 181.2.
89. 372 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
90. Id. at 541-43.
91. Id. at 560-61.
92. Id. at 545.
93. Id. at 545-46.
94. Id. at 551-53.
95. Id. at 553.
96. Id. at 559.
97. See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-19 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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or prevent minority group isolation; and to aid the students themselves in
overcoming the educational disadvantages of minority group isolation. 99
Under the guidelines for administration of the program, 0 0 districts were
eligible for assistance whether they were desegregating under court order or
voluntarily. 101 A detailed schedule of criteria for assistance was establishedl10
giving the greatest consideration to a school district's proposed "effective net
reduction in minority group isolation.110 3
The congressional intent"' 4 becomes somewhat clouded by the statement
that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring any local
educational agency which assigns students to schools on the basis of geo-
graphic attendance areas drawn on a racially nondiscriminatory basis to adopt
any other method of student assignment."' 0 5 Since the areas must be drawn
on a "racially nondiscriminatory basis," there appears to be a further rein-
forcement of the de jure-de facto distinction, as well as the immunity of de
facto segregation from either judicial or legislative remedial action. When
considered in relation to what the Court was doing at that time, the shift of
positions that took place between the Swan and Keyes decisions becomes
somewhat more comprehensible. 10 6 The Court apparently yielded to the
design of the legislature, as extrapolated from this section of the Act. This in
itself poses no problem, as it corresponds to the basic framework of our
tripartite government. 0 7
Thus, over the course of time Congress seems to be getting progressively
more specific in enunciating its underlying intent; here, actually saying what it
had previously referred to under the guise of "overcoming racial imbal-
ance." 108 Congress was also very careful in its language to limit the scope of
its application. Thus a subsequent title supplementing ESAA 10 9 adopts, in
effect, the Title IV definition of desegregation;'" 0 imposes a prohibition
against the use of appropriated funds for busing;"' and provides for a
suspension of the implementation of any court orders requiring transportation
for desegregation pending their outcome on appeal.
21 2
99. Id. § 1601(b). "The terms 'minority group isolated school' and 'minority group isolation' in
reference to a school mean a school and condition, respectively, in which minority group children
constitute more than so percentum of the enrollment of a school." Id. § 1619(10).
100. 45 C.F.R. § 185 (1975).
101. Id. § 185.11(a, b).
102. Id. § 185.14.
103. Id. § 185.14(a)(2)(i).
104. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1618 (Supp. IV, 1974).
106. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
107. But see notes 155-56 infra and accompanying text.
108. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. II, 1972).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
111. 20 U.S.C. § 1652 (Supp. IV, 1974); compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a2) (1970), as
amended, id. § 2000c-6(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1653 (Supp. II, 1972).
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This last provision was given a very limited application by Justice Powell in
his ruling in Drummond v. Acree. 113 It was observed that the terms of 20
U.S.C. § 1653 "[do] not purport to block all desegregation orders which
require the transportation of students. If Congress had desired to stay all such
orders it could have used clear and explicit language appropriate to that
result."'"14 Court-ordered transportation was still a valid means of achieving
school desegregation as long as the purpose was not to overcome racial
imbalance,"I5 and voluntary busing plans retained their viability as within the
discretion of local school officials.'
1 6
It appears that at this point in the legislative progression toward equal
educational opportunity, Congress had adopted a combative attitude toward
the courts. The newer legislation specifically restricted court orders, "7 rather
than addressing directly the substantive issues of desegregation. Congressional
intent appears to have been geared toward preventing the courts from
effecting too much change in the systems of education, as well as curtailing
the use of busing as a desegregation device. Instead of taking the lead in
proposing realistic ways to provide truly integrated schools, the legislators
have waited for the courts to act, then have imposed restrictions on the use of
these remedies. 118 Although this appears on its face to reflect the basic scheme
of our governmental system, it can prove a dangerous practice. It has been
warned" that:
[If our system of government is to work well and retain the confidence of our people,
and if the institutions of our government are not to destroy each other in chaotic
conflict, Congress and the President ought to provoke a direct clash with the Supreme
Court only as a very last, only despairing resort. For only two outcomes of such a clash
are possible. Either the Supreme Court digs in its heels and dashes popular expecta-
tions that Congress and the President have raised, thus discrediting Congress and the
President, or itself, or more likely both. Or the Court surrenders, reverses itself, and
leaves the indelible impression, at least for a generation, that it is not independent,
that it does not follow ... its own precedents, but rather the election returns. Neither
result is beneficial. 19
113. 93 S. Ct. 18 (1972) (Powell, J., sitting as a Circuit Justice).
114. Id. at 20. Justice Powell reasoned: "In [20 U.S.C. § 1652], which precedes [20 U.S.C.
§ 1653], Congress prohibited the use of federal funds to aid in any program for the transportation of
students if the design of the program is to 'overcome racial imbalance' or to 'carry out a plan of
racial desegregation.' It is clear from the juxtaposition and the language of these two sections that
Congress intended to proscribe the use of federal funds for the transportation of students under
any desegregation plan but limited the stay provisions of [§ 1653] to desegregation plans that seek
to achieve racial balance." Id. (emphasis and citation omitted).
115. Darville v. Dade County School Bd., 351 F. Supp. 1249, 1250-51 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd,
497 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1974).
116. See Darville v. Dade County School Bd., 497 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1974), where It was
pointed out that the "local school officials are not restricted by the provisions" limiting the use of
busing. Id. at 1005.
117. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 156-59 infra and accompanying text.
119. Bickel, Untangling the Busing Snarl, in The Great School Bus Controversy 34 (N. Mills
ed. 1973).
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One illustration of this conflict is evidenced by the conference committee
report accompanying ESAA, where the legislators expressed their hope that
"the judiciary will take such action as may be necessary to expedite the
resolution of the issues subject to this section." 120 The reaction of the courts,
while not outwardly defiant, 12 1 has consistently given these provisions a very
limited interpretation. 1
22
Further analysis of the legislative history of ESAA reveals that while there
is a very clear intent to make the eligibility criteria for assistance as broad and
flexible as possible,' 23 the substance of the enactments appear calculated to
provoke little change or disruption in the current operations of the local school
districts. 124 An inference may be drawn that Congress did not intend that
school districts undertake a massive reduction in minority group isolation on a
district-wide scale-an inference which is reinforced by consideration of the
legislative history of the Education Amendments of 1974.12s Further provi-
sions have made certain changes in the ESAA legislation,12 6 the most sig-
nificant being in the criteria to determine eligibility for assistance. 127 Congress
observed:
The Committee bill contains an amendment to the Emergency School Aid Act to
clarify the eligibility of local educational agencies in which a majority of the students
120. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2670 (1972).
121. See, e.g., Medley v. School Bd., 350 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Va. 1972), remanded, 482 F.2d
1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1172 (1974). Here the court, finding 20 U.S.C. § 16S3
directly applicable to the facts in issue, observed that "the section is not an unwarranted intrusion
into the judiciary and instead is a Constitutionally permissible Congressional limitation on the
powers of this court." 3S0 F. Supp. at 56.
122. See notes 74-77, 113-16 supra and accompanying text. It has also been held that these
restrictions on judicial power within ESAA do not apply retroactively. Soria v. Oxnard School
Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 467 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
123. "The Senate amendment, but not the House amendment, provided that applicant school
districts in order to be eligible must establish at least one stable, quality, integrated school and
must have adopted a comprehensive district-wide plan for the elimination of minority group
isolation to the maximum extent possible in all schools of such agencies. The conference substitute
does not contain the Senate provision." 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2664 (1972). "The Senate
amendment, but not the House amendment, required that the Secretary [of Education] must
approve first those applications which place the largest numbers and the greatest percentages of
minority children in stable, quality, integrated schools. The conference substitute does not
contain this provision." Id. at 2666.
124. "The House amendment, but not the Senate amendment, required that nothing in this
title could be construed as requiring any local educational agency which assigns students to
schools on the basis of geographic attendance areas drawn on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
to adopt any other method of student assignment whether or not the use of such geographic
attendance areas results in the complete desegregation of the schools of such agency. The
conference substitute contains the House provision except for the reference to whether or not the
use of such areas results in the complete desegregation of the schools of such agency." Id. at 2669.
125. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-19 (Supp. IV, 1974). Several sections have been amended since 1974.
See note 126 infra.
126. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1603, 1605, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1615, 1619 (Supp. 1976).
127. Id. § 1605(a)(1)(E). The new addition allows a school district to apply for assistance in
establishing or maintaining one or more integrated schools.
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are classified as being from minorities. The Committee adopted this amendment
because the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has misinterpreted the
Emergency School Aid Act and, through its regulations, has barred from eligibility any
local school district unless that district has adopted a comprehensive integration plan.
It was clearly not the intent of Congress that school districts, a majority of whose
students are minorities, should be required to adopt comprehensive district-wide plans
for integration in order to become eligible for basic grants, pilot programs, or bilingual
education programs. This amendment will have the effect of repealing that regulation
of the Office of Education ... to make such school districts eligible for those grants. 12
In addition to these changes within ESAA, the Education Amendments of
1974 contained new provisions addressed to the busing controversy, entitled
"Equal Educational Opportunities and Transportation of Students."' 29 This
section provides remedial guidelines 3 0 for the elimination of dual school
systems, 13' as long as the segregation was de jure. 132 It also established
priorities for the imposition of these remedies.' 33 In addition, Congress
limited the scope of any transportation order to include only the school closest
or next closest to the student's place of residence, 134 and directed that in
fashioning a remedy, school district lines should not be ignored unless those
lines were drawn with an intent to segregate.135
Further restrictions were enacted late in 1975, with congressional approval
of an amendment to the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education and
Welfare Appropriation Act of 1976.136 The amendment prohibits the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare from using any of its money "to
128. 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4156-57 (1974). The committee expressed further
concern that eligibility for the grants was being determined too restrictively. In criticizing the
administration of the Act, the committee observed that "[t]he Department of Health, Education
and Welfare has turned a deaf ear to efforts to explain Congressional intent and to efforts by
outside organizations, even including the statutorily established National Advisory Council on
Equality of Educational Opportunity, to offer advice on this and other points involved in the
administration of the program. This lack of responstl'eness by the Department and its restrictive
interpretations of the Act led to more than $33 million from the fiscal 1973 appropriation
reverting to the Treasury. If the Department had vigorously supported the Act in Its true intent,
it would have been able to spend the entire appropriation. It should be noted here that the
appropriation was only 50% of the authorization for 1973." Id. at 4157.
129. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-21 (Supp. 1976).
130. Id. §§ 1712-18, which requires "only such remedies as are essential ..
131. Id. § 1702(b).
132. Id. §§ 1703-04; see Brinkman v. Gilligan, 518 F.2d 853,856 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
433 (1975).
133. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1713 (Supp. 1976). This section makes assignment to schools closest to
home the foremost priority, followed by voluntary transfer, revision of attendance zones, new
school construction and closing of old schools, magnet schools, and lastly, "any other plan which
is educationally sound and administratively feasible" within the limits on the use of transportation
set forth in other sections of the Act.
134. Id. § 1714.
135. Id. § 1715.
136. H.R. 8069, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (enacted by Congress but vetoed by President
Ford on Dec. 19, 1975).
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require, directly or indirectly, the transportation of any student to a school
other than the school which is nearest the student's home, and which offers
the courses of study pursued by such student, in order to comply with Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."'13
Title VI prohibits the practice of racial discrimination in any program
receiving federal financial assistance 38 and provides for termination of the
grant in case of a finding of such discrimination. 139 This law has been seen
not only as a declaration of national policy in civil rights, but as a basis for a
new approach to school desegregation. 40 It is feared, however, that certain
aspects of the Senate Amendment to the Appropriations bill may undermine
the effect of Title VI with respect to a number of discriminatory practices
unrelated to busing.' 41
IV. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE
AND THE JUDICIARY
While congressional and judicial efforts to achieve equal educational oppor-
tunity have been extensive, it has been observed that many children through-
out the country, and especially in the larger cities, attend school primarily
with members of their own race. 142 As litigation continues to be brought, the
parties tend to take positions upon which they are generally unwilling to
compromise. Indeed, this has led one court to complain that "[a]ll parties
appeal with typical inflexibility of position, understandably, perhaps, because
of the great complexity of the problem and the inevitable intrusion of naked
emotion and worrisome economic problems. Public objectivity is not to be
even hoped for and judicial objectivity is difficult indeed."'143
As previously indicated, the courts are hamstrung by the de jure-de facto
distinction. 144 Their difficulty lies in finding the requisite state action and then
determining how far to go in correcting racial imbalance. 14S One court has
disregarded the distinction, recognizing that elimination of de facto segrega-
tion is desirable in and of itself "and that it is educationally important to
children of all races in preparing them to exist harmoniously in a pluralistic,
melting-pot society.' 4 6 That this distinction should be eliminated is an
137. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
139. Id. § 2000d-1.
140. Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, S3 Va. L. Rev.
42, 43 (1967); see Comment, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 Yale
L.J. 321, 322 (1967).
141. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 17, col. 1.
142. Dell'Ario, Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on the Equity Power of the Federal
Courts?, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 113 (1975).
143. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
806 (1976).
144. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
145. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en bane)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
146. Higgins v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444, 486 (W.D. Mich. 1973), af'd, S0 F.2d
779 (6th Cir. 1974).
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ever-increasing need, since shifts in demographic makeup of the population
centers throughout all parts of the country are more the cause of racial
imbalance than were the earlier state laws or policies encouraging segrega-
tion. 147 Unfortunately, this approach to the problem has not been adopted by
the courts, except in limited instances. 14 8 However, the argument is persua-
sive that because any form of segregation has a harmful psychological and
educational impact on the people affected, the requirement of finding an
intent to segregate is not important enough to support the distinction.14
9
Indeed, the argument has been made that the section in the Brown I decision
dealing with the harmful social and educational effects of segregation ' ° blurs
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, so that the "disestab-
lishment of a legally enforced dual [school] system cannot be said to have
ocurred [sic] until the maximum amount of integration has taken place.'' 1 s5
There is argument that the Court's motive in upholding this distinction is
less a fair application of constitutional principle than it is a reaction to a
perceived public mood that enough has been done already to enforce the
equalities guaranteed by our Constitution. 15 2 This method of decision is seen
as weakening the effectiveness of the courts: "It is when judges begin to
evaluate the political calculus, and modify their decisions to seek an accom-
modation, that they fail."'' 5 3
Another argument is that the Court's only mandate is to remedy de jure
situations, and that the courts are neither an adequate nor a proper forum for
remedying our various social ills.' 5 4 This contention points out that since the
judiciary is the branch of government with the "smallest popular base of
support," it is particularly ill-adapted to deal with social problems of such a
far-reaching character.15 5 Critics rightly contend that it is the function of
Congress, as the popularly elected representatives of the citizenry, to legislate
147. Dell'Ario, Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on the Equity Power of the Federal
Courts?, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 113 (1975).
148. See Pena v. Superior Ct., 50 Cal. App. 3d 694, 123 Cal. Rptr. 500 (5th Dist. 1973),
where the California law is expressed as granting a cause of action for relief from de facto
segregation "when the plaintiff alleges actual educational harm to the minority students as a
result of the segregation." Id. at 703, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
149. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
Calif. L. Rev. 275, 435 (1972).
150. See notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
151. Bickel, Untangling the Busing Snarl, in The Great School Bus Controversy 30 (N. Mills
ed. 1973).
152. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Taylor, The
Supreme Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley, 21 Wayne L.
Rev. 751, 776-77 (1975).
153. Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There is but one Constitution, 7 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1, 53-54 (1972).
154. Goodman, Integration, Yes; Busing, No, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § 6 (Magazine) at
46-48.
155. Note, Consolidation for Desegregation: The Unresolved Issue of the Inevitable Sequel,
82 Yale L.J. 1681, 1693 (1973).
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a solution to such pervasive problems. 15 6 However, until Congress takes the
initiative to develop a new and more effective approach to alleviating the
conditions of segregation in the nation, rather than defensive legislation aimed
more at the courts than at the problems of equal education,1 57 any real
solution is difficult to imagine. 158 Until then, the federal position on school
desegregation will be a confusing and hotly debated issue. Only confusion can
result when a different approach, indeed a different philosophy with a
different goal, is reflected in the actions of the other branches of govern-
ment.1 59 When this happens in such a volatile area as school desegregation,
the results can be harmful as the education of our young is allowed to suffer
while the debate continues. This situation has led to the conclusion that "It]he
Federal Government does not appear to have any consistent policy of enforc-
ing integration, ' 160 and a characterization of the government's efforts in this
area as a " 'model of inefficiency.' "161
One possible solution would be to do away with the artificial distinctions of
de jure and de facto segregation. The efforts of the federal government could
then be concentrated on the attainment of equal access to a quality education.
In this approach, the role of the social sciences could be increased 162 to focus
on the best way to achieve this end. 163 The problem is no longer isolated in
the southern states, but is a national phenomenon' 64 which can only be dealt
156. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The
Court there acknowledged that reform of our basic tax structure would aid the attainment of
complete equal educational opportunity, but felt constrained since "the ultimate solutions must
come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them." Id. at 59.
On the issue of school tax reform see Comment, An Analysis and Review of School Financing
Reform, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 773 (1976).
157. See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text.
158. This responsibility appears to rest squarely on the Congress, since the courts "have no
roving commission to seek out and right wrongs; the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, and
they, fortunately, are only authorized to decide a question after it has been presented as a 'case or
controversy' under a pertinent statutory or constitutional provision." McMillan, Social Science
and the District Court: The Observations of a Journeyman Trial Judge, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob.
157, 158 (1975).
159. See Time, Sept. 22, 1975, at 7-8.
160. Kifner, North's Schools Face a Long, Hot Autumn, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § 4, at
6, col. 1.
161. Id. at col. 4, quoting J. Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
162. See Armor, The Evidence on Busing, in The Great School Bus Controversy 81-82 (N.
Mills ed. 1973).
163. Another inducement has been suggested. Social science evidence in these cases can be
seen as "the kind of support a court likes to find in a record to lend factual and scientific aura to a
result sustainable by other, perhaps purely abstract and sometimes formalistically legal, consider-
ations, but dictated by the moral necessity of changing social attitudes." Wisdom, Random
Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judicial Decision-Making Process in School
Desegregation Cases, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 134, 142 (1975).
164. See Pettigrew, A Sociological View of the Post-Bradley Era, 21 Wayne L. Rev. 813
(1975). There, it is pointed out: "Remarkably enough, considerable racial desegregation has taken
place in the nation's public schools despite the intense resistance. The sharpest gains came in the
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with through a new and comprehensive approach directly confronting the
issue.
The use of transportation seems to be the swiftest and most direct means
toward the goal of desegregating our schools. However, the problems inherent
in this method have only resulted in a clouding of the issues, and further
resistance to the enforcement of our constitutional principles. The use of
busing has further compounded the problems by its effect on "white flight"--
the process by which those who can afford to do so transfer their children to
private schools or move from the district to avoid the effect of a court
order. 165 Although the courts have consistently refused to allow this to
interfere with the dismantling of a dual school system, 166 its effects can be
far-reaching:
In the court's opinion the effect of mandatory transportation on students can be
neutral or destructive, depending upon the community's response to the requirements
of the law . ... If the atmosphere surrounding desegregation is such that a child goes
to a school where children of other races welcome him without fear, and where he can
learn in an educationally productive atmosphere, the fact that his school is a bus-ride
away may be little more than an inconvenience.
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Thus the attitude of the community is an important element in the use of this
remedy. This attitude could be greatly improved if busing were to be
employed only as a temporary means to effect a long term transition to equal
educational opportunity for all children.
Another possibility would include the reorganization of school districts, as it
has been observed that "[w]here districts can be consolidated, a single
decisive intervention by the judiciary can correct the constitutional wrong and
leave local political processes free to function as in any other desegregated
districts. 1 6 8 Then, with the implementation of certain safeguards or reassur-
South during the late 1960's and early 1170's. The number of black children in all-black southern
schools declined from 40 percent in 1968 to 12 percent in 1971; those in predominantly white
schools rose from 18 percent in 1968 to 44 percent by 1971. Indeed, by the fall of 1970 a greater
percentage of black children in the South attended majority-white public schools (38 percent) than
in the North (28 percent). A more sensitive indicator, the racial segregation index (RSI), reveals
the same trend. In 42 southern urban districts, the degree of student segregation was nearly
halved between 1967 and 1972, dropping from 88 percent to 48 percent. This compares with only
modest reductions during these same 5 years in eight border urban districts, in which segregation
dropped from 80 percent to 69 percent; 62 northern urban districts (from 68 percent to 61
percent); and 16 western urban districts (from 67 percent to 50 percent). On the RSI index, too,
by 1972 the South had the lowest degree of racial school segregation." Id. at 815 (footnotes and
emphasis omitted).
165. See Goodman, Integration, Yes; Busing, No, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § 6
(Magazine), at 10.
166. E.g., United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1972);
Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 794 (6th Cir. 1974); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp.
216, 233-34 (D. Mass. 1975).
167. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 239-40 (D. Mass. 1975).
168. Hain, Techniques of Governmental Reorganization to Achieve School Desegregation, 21
Wayne L. Rev. 779, 810-11 (1975). But see text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
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ance to the community, 69 a temporary busing program could be used as a
means toward the ultimate goal: complete integration of the races. Eight
conditions have been theorized which can help maximize the probability of
integration and which should be considered in all desegregation litigation:
(1) Both races must have equal access to the school's resources ....
(2) Classroom-not just school--desegregation is essential for actual integration....
(3) Strict ability grouping should be avoided ...
(4) School services and remedial training must be maintained or improved after
desegregation ...
(5) Desegregation should be initiated in the early grades ...
(6) The need for interracial staffs is critical ...
(7) Substantial, rather than token, minority percentages are necessary....
(8) Race and social class must not be confounded in the interracial school .... 170
It appears that there has been some progress toward the attainment of
equal education opportunity,1 71 some dearly visible and some obscure. As one
observation of the status of school desegregation makes clear
The issue is not whether actions by public officials which maintain or foster racial
segregation in the schools should be tolerated. Such actions are clearly unconstitutional
and are no longer debatable. Similarly, the issue whether we should, as a matter of
national commitment and public policy, move toward the goal of integrated classrooms
is no longer debatable. Rather, the issue is how the goal of increasing integration can
best be attained. 1
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V. CONCLUSION
Some observers have remarked that congressional action to restrict busing
reveals the extent of our underlying racism as Americans, 17 3 while others
argue that the negativism results from the voters' opposition to imposition of a
governmental plan upon the parents' choice of schools.' 7 4 Whatever the
motivation, it is suggested that there is a need to restructure the entire
emphasis of educational legislation, placing more emphasis on the use of
assistance to implement "coherent, well-planned local efforts to improve
primary and secondary education" than on combatting the action of the
169. For example, it has been observed that busing can be more peacefully accomplished
when: "1) the numbei of nonwhites in each school is less than 40%; 2) students are not bused to
schools that are inferior to the ones that they previously attended; 3) schools are near enough so
that the parents of the bused students can easily stay involved in them; 4) most parents, educators
and city officials are committed to preventing disturbances; and 5) black-white advisory groups
are formed to defuse problems in advance." Time, Sept. 22, 1975, at 13.
170. Pettigrew, A Sociological View of the Post-Bradley Era, 21 Wayne L. Rev. 813, 820-24
(1975) (emphasis omitted).
171. See note 164 supra.
172. Hawley & Rist, On The Future Implementation of School Desegregation: Some Consid-
erations, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 412, 413 (1975).
173. J. Bolner & R. Shanley, Busing: The Political and Judicial Process 56 (1974).
174. Preyer, Beyond Desegregation-What Ought To Be Done?, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 657, 660
(1973).
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courts. 175 The result of such an attitude on the complex issues involved in
school desegregation could be far-reaching and dramatic:
District judges before whom school suits are brought are made to confront what is
usually a wasteland: a school district deteriorating in every way, sinking deeper and
deeper into racial isolation, and doing nothing about it. So the judge orders integration
and busing. That is all he can do, short of throwing up his hands, which after 18 years
in the school business he no longer thinks he may do. The record of the wasteland and
of the judge's response to it then moves up to the Supreme Court. There the doctrinal
pull of Brown v. Board of Education again exerts its force, a principled line between
any case and the one immediately preceding it is hard to find-if we said desegrega-
tion, why not more desegregation?-and what happens is what we have seen happen.
But if Congress and the President, instead of fighting the courts, try to get school
districts to fight the reality to which the courts have been reacting, and manage to
present courts in the future with school districts embarked on concentrated long-range
reforms, then, without needing to renege on prior decisions and without accepting any
impairment of the general function of judicial review, courts will be able to say that
they are now faced with new facts, with a new reality, which no longer calls for the
old remedies. And the Supreme Court will agree. Or so-candor compels one to
add-so [sic] one would expect. 176
For the present, however, the emphasis remains on the transportation
issue, which is an infinitely more emotional problem than that of the standard
of education itself.1 77 This is unfortunate, because lurking behind the vocal
opposition to "forced busing," there is a concern about the quality of educa-
tion received in the schools at the end of the bus ride. It is contended that the
decline in the quality of education at certain minority schools has led to the
need for forced busing to achieve equal educational opportunity.17 8
Surveys have repeatedly shown that a majority of Americans, both black and white,
overwhelmingly favor integration but oppose busing to accomplish it in schools.
Part of the opposition is racist; much is based on fears among both black and white
parents that desegregation will endanger the children. In addition, white parents fear
that busing will lead to lowered academic standards. Compounding parents' worries is
that the experience of those cities that have had forced busing is somewhat confusing
and contradictory. 179
One proposed solution suggests revisions in the governmental organization
of school districts, including: consolidation, inter-district transfers, and um-
175. Bickel, Untangling the Busing Snarl, in The Great School Bus Controversy 27, 36 (N.
Mills ed. 1973).
176. Id. at 37.
177. A recent analyis of the views on the busing situation in Louisville, Ky. reported on a
white mother of school age children: ". . . [T]he McCauleys feel put upon by Government. 'We've
been shoved,' says Mrs. McCauley. 'Unemployment is running wild; inflation is killing us. Now
the Federal Government steps in and orders this busing. We're fighting for our freedom as
Americans.' Sadly she adds, 'I get up some mornings and feel like I want to secede.' " Time, Sept.
22, 1975, at 12.
178. See Edelman, The Necessity of School Desegregation, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1975, at
33, col. 2.
179. Time, Sept. 22, 1975, at 11.
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brella districts.' 8 0 Although this is only one of many alternatives that have
been proposed,' 8 ' and despite the fact that this may face constitutional
challenges of its own, it exemplifies the possible areas that Congress could
explore in providing substantive assistance in solving the problems of racial
isolation in America. Whether they will be able to see beyond the narrow
issue of busing to the broad problems facing the American educational system
is a matter of conjecture. But it is hoped that emotional considerations will be
put aside and replaced by a practical and rational approach that will provide
substantive and meaningful assistance.
Edward P. Meyers
180. Hain, Techniques of Governmental Reorganization to Achieve School Desegregation, 21
Wayne L. Rev. 779, 782-87 (1975).
181. E.g., Hamilton, The Nationalist vs. the Integrationist, in The Great School Bus
Controversy 297 (N. Mills ed. 1973) (suggests united action by all factions seeking to promote
integration better to effect their goals through the political process); Orfield, How To Make
Desegregation Work. The Adaptation of Schools to Their Newly-Integrated Student Bodies, 39
Law & Contemp. Prob. 314, 317 (1975) (suggests adaptations involving the personnel, students
and curriculum of the desegregated school itsel); Goodman, Integration, Yes; Busing, No, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 48 (suggests making integrated schools more attractive
to whites by giving them one and one-half times the budget of a nonintegrated school and keeping
them open from the time parents go to work until they return).
